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The use of long-term contracts in the procurement of coal for electricity generation is 
common.  The data that is observed from contracts and their transactions are from 
different levels of the pricing process.  Contracts contain the parameters by which all 
future deliveries are structured, specifying the length of the agreement and acceptable 
coal attributes. Based on these parameters, a price is later determined for successive coal 
deliveries and the transaction occurs.  This data structure fits well into multi-level 
models, where each level of the process is empirically estimated. A random intercept 
model is estimated where the first level is a hedonic model of coal prices.  The contract 
that initiates the delivery is used to connect the two levels of the model.  In the second 
level, contract coefficients from the first level are regressed on contract parameters to 
determine their impact on how coal is priced.  Results find that many contract parameters 
are statistically significant in the price of coal.     
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The use of long-term contracts (>1 year) in the procurement of coal for electric 
generation is common.  Power plants, railroads (or other options for transport) and mines 
negotiate the parameters of a contract and then transact based on the terms established 
over time. Some of the parameters that are often agreed upon in a contract are minimum 
quantity, acceptable coal attributes (quality), and length of the contract.   
 
The nested structure of these transactions can be used to determine how contract 
parameters affect the price of coal. The determination of the price of a coal delivery 
depends upon data that are at two different levels; the delivered quality of the coal and 
the parameters of the contract for the coal.  Multi-level models (also known as 
hierarchical models) fit contract data well.  In this analysis, each level of the contract 
process is analyzed separately using a random intercept model.  In the first level, a 
hedonic price regression is estimated using data on coal deliveries, controlling for the 
delivered coal attributes and contract fixed effects.  In the second level, these estimated 
contract (fixed effects) coefficients are regressed on the contract parameters. This will 
allow for the estimation of the effect of contract parameters on the price of coal 
controlling for the delivered quality of coal. 
   
Data from U.S. coal contracts for electricity generation from 1979-1999 are used to 
estimate the multi-level model described above.  Second level results show that longer 
contracts are associated with a higher price.  One contract parameter of interest is the 
allowable sulfur content upper bound.  During the sample period, environmental 
regulation of sulfur dioxide (SO2), an emission that is a by product of coal combustion, 
  
changed from an emissions standard to a tradable permit system.  As a result, plants 
would value marginal changes in the sulfur content. Indeed, the results show that the 
allowable upper bound on sulfur content was statistically insignificant prior to this 




Power plants, railroads and mines are endowed with characteristics that fit well with the 
transactions cost theory originated with Coase (1937) and expanded upon by Williamson 
(1985) and Klein et al (1978).  Plants are fixed in location and may have asset specificity. 
Rail firms can service only mines and plants their tracks connect. Coal has many 
attributes that are easily measured.  As a result, contracts for the procurement of coal 
seem to be driven by transaction cost theory rather than asymmetric information issues1.   
 
Transactions cost theory predicts that contracts are written with parameters that minimize 
contracting costs.  This prediction is reasonable because repeated bargaining between 
firms is expensive and leaves them open to ex-post opportunistic behavior or the “hold 
up” problem in which one firm makes an investment whose value is largely determined 
through the use of the other firm’s product and subsequently finds that the other firm tries 
to take advantage by raising the price of the product. 2 A contract is written that specifies 
the terms of future transactions. The terms serve to minimize the expected costs of 
                                                 
1 This is belief is confirmed by the economics literature on coal contracts, discussed below, which are 
exclusively based on transaction cost theory. 
2 One alternative to contracting in the face of opportunistic behavior is vertical integration.  However, state 
and federal regulators of plants strongly discourages this, even under restructured electricity markets. 
However, most of our sample is from pre-restructuring. 
  
transacting.  Firm characteristics will partially determine the expected transactions costs, 
thus these characteristics will explain the contract’s parameters. 
 
Transaction cost theory has been empirically tested in a number of economic fields and 
has been applied in many other social sciences (Richman and Macher, 2006). Transaction 
cost theory has been discussed in a number of energy and resource markets.  Crocker and 
Matsen (1991) use natural gas contract data to show that longer contracts have more 
flexible pricing arrangements. Additionally they demonstrate that those contracts with 
less flexible pricing arrangements have more flexibility in the other contract parameters. 
Neumann and von Hirschhausen (2006) show that the duration of natural gas contracts 
falls as the market becomes more competitive but that contracts with higher degrees of 
asset specificity are longer. Dahl and Matson (1998) discuss qualitatively how 
transactions costs have shaped the natural gas market in the U.S.  Saussier (2000) 
evaluates coal transportation contracts in France to show that the number of unspecified 
or vague obligations, defined as completeness, in a contract varies with the asset 
specificity of the contracting parties. 
 
Some of the early empirical tests of transaction cost theory come from coal contracts. The 
most common empirical test is the relationship between asset specificity and duration. 
The most well known are the seminal works of Joskow (1985, 1987, 1988, 1990). Joskow 
(1987) finds that minemouth plants write longer contracts due to their higher asset 
specificity and lack of alternative suppliers.  Joskow (1988) reviews the price adjustment 
mechanisms used in these contracts as they relate to transaction cost theory.  Joskow 
  
(1988 and 1990) discusses when certain types of price adjustment mechanisms perform 
better than others. Kerkvilet and Shogren (2001) study the effect of a large set of 
transaction cost variables on the duration of a contract.  They show that asset specificity 
increases the length of contract but that previous interaction shortens the length.  
 
Empirical work investigating the how the tradable permit system altered rent distribution 
generally find that mines and rail firm took advantage of this regulation to increase their 
share of the gains from trade. Keohane and Busse (2007) sketch a model of price 
discrimination in coal transactions based on where the plant is located relative to the 
Western coal basin.  They find that railroads altered their pricing to plants subject to the 
tradable permit system based on how close the plant was to the Western coal basin, as 
this defined the alternative available.  Lange and Bellas (2007) argue that contracts of 
different vintages can provide information on future permit prices through the implied 
sulfur premium.  Results show that the sulfur premium increased after the announcement 
of a tradable permit system for SO2 emissions but that the sulfur premium in these 
contracts were much lower than predictions available at that time.   
 
Crocker and Matsen (1991) and Goldberg (1985) discuss a relational perspective to 
contract parameter determination.  It is argued that contract should not been seen as fixed 
and inflexible mandates on behavior.  Contracts are an imperfect instrument for 
protecting against “ex-post” rent seeking given that contract language and court 
enforcement are imperfect.  Contracts should rather be seen as setting the structure for 
future negotiations.  This perspective is utilized in the analysis presented here.     
  
 
A coal contract involves three parties: the mine, a transporting firm(s), and the plant.  The 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that over 70% of coal is shipped by 
rail exclusively. We will use the term rail firm to imply the transportation firm unless 
noted.  However, the distribution of rents between the mine and rail firm are unknown.  
Thus we will consider the mine and rail firm to be one entity when discussing how gains 
and loses are determined.  A higher price would just give the mine and rail firm a bigger 
pie to split; a lower price a smaller pie.      
 
Coal is a product with many attributes that determine its quality and thus price.  As a 
result, most contracts specify allowable levels of coal attributes.  The most common 
attributes specified by contracts for which data are available, are quantity, British 
Thermal Units (Btus), sulfur, ash, and moisture content.3   Higher Btus are a good 
attribute to have, while higher sulfur, ash, and moisture are not.  
 
Coal attributes can vary substantially by region. There are three major U.S. coal basins 
that power plants use to meet their demand. The first one is the Western basin. It includes 
Wyoming, Montana, and Colorado. The second one is the Interior Basin, which includes 
Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky. Last is the Appalachian Basin, which includes West 
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. Coal mines are endowed with coal of a certain 
quality; however variability exists within a coal mine (often referred to as a seam or bed).  
The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) warn that sampling a coal 
                                                 
3 There are other coal attributes that plants may value for which data is not available though they are often 
correlated with the observable attributes.  For example, grindability is largely a function of BTU, ash, and 
moisture content. As a result, these unobserved attributes are likely to be similar within contract deliveries. 
  
seam/bed for its quality may not be representative of the entire coal seam/bed due to this 
variability (ASTM, 2007).   
 
Due to the inherent variability in coal seams/beds a mine would find it advantageous to 
have greater flexibility in the allowable levels of coal attributes for delivery in its 
contracts. Contracts that specify a higher (lower) allowable upper bound on 
ash/sulfur/moisture (Btu) provide the mines with greater flexibility to meet the contract 
but potentially provide the plant with a lower quality coal.   
 
In essence, the allowable levels of coal attributes specified in a contract acts as a quasi-
forward contract.  The mine hedges against higher (lower) than expected 
ash/sulfur/moisture (Btu) contents being found in a coal seam and accepts a price 
reduction to compensate.  The plant exposes itself to risk of lower quality coal but is 
compensated with a lower coal price. Mines would be willing to accept a lower price for 
coal of a given quality due to the decreased risk of not meeting the contract.  Plants 
would be willing to pay a lower price for coal of given quality due to the increased risk of 
burning lower quality coal. As a result, it is expected that increasing (decreasing) the 
allowable upper bound on ash/sulfur/moisture (Btu) in a contract would reduce the price 
of coal transacted (controlling for the actual delivered quality of the coal).    
 
The cost to the plant of burning lower quality coal depends on which attribute is present 
in higher quantities.  Ash and moisture generally do not lead to the emission of a 
regulated pollutant but would lower the efficiency of producing electricity.  However, the 
  
sulfur content of the coal leads directly to emissions of SO2.  Some background on the 
history of SO2 regulation is needed to set expectations for the direction of impact the 
allowable sulfur content upper bound would have on prices.  Title IV of the 1990 CAAA 
created a system of tradable permits for SO2 emissions that would eventually apply to 
most coal-burning power plants in the U.S.  The goal of the system was a 10 million ton 
reduction in SO2 emissions, about 50 percent of 1985 emissions, by the year 2010.  Phase 
I of the permit system began in 1995 with the inclusion of approximately 263 older 
boilers whose participation was mandated plus 174 newer boilers that would have been 
brought in under Phase II but voluntarily entered during Phase I. Previous regulation of 
SO2 had been a mix of lax state regulation or emissions/technological federal standards.  
The relevant issue for this analysis is that previous to 1990, plants did not face a marginal 
cost of SO2 emissions and thus it is expected that they would not price the sulfur content 
of coal. After 1990, the tradable permit program initiated a price per SO2 emissions, thus 
plants would consider the cost of marginal changes to the sulfur content of coal.   
 
In writing a contract, the plant and mine agree to an allowable upper bound on the sulfur 
content.  Any increase in this allowable upper bound leaves the plant vulnerable to 
accepting higher than desired sulfur content in the coal.  If a higher sulfur content coal is 
delivered, the plant must alter its compliance strategy to deal with the higher resulting 
SO2 emissions.  The tradable permit market provides plants with the flexibility to take 
higher sulfur content coal and provides a measure of the costs of these excess emissions 
through the permit price.  Previous to the 1990 CAAA, plants were not priced at the 
margin for their emissions, thus they would be less concerned about the impact of a 
  
higher allowable upper bound for sulfur content and mines would be more likely to be 
able to sell coal with higher sulfur content.       
 
In this analysis, coal contract data will be analyzed using multi-level or hierarchical 
models. Multi-level models allow for an estimation of data where observations may be 
correlated based on some shared circumstances between groups.  Multi-level models are 
quite common in educational policy research (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Goldstein, 
1987).  In an educational policy, the levels (shared circumstances) would be the 
schools/districts that set the subjects taught, the teacher that teaches the subject, and the 
students that are tested.  Generally the levels used in educational policy research are 
students at the first, teachers at the second, schools at the third, and on.   
 
In the economics literature, multi-level models are commonly used in health economics 
(Manca et al, 2005; Scott and Shiell, 1997). There is a small literature in environmental 
economics (Bateman and Jones, 2003; Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001; Langford et al, 
1998) that revolves around contingent valuation studies where groups of people surveyed 
are similarly affected by the environmental outcome in question.  Searches of economic 
literature database have yet to reveal use of multi-level models in the industrial 
organization literature. 
 
Multi-level models are useful in analyzing many types of contract or industrial 
organization data.  Contract formation, whether in traditional transactions cost theory or 
in the relational view, fits into the structure necessary for estimation with multi-level 
  
models.  Coal contracts are nested in that the contract parameters influence the price and 
quality of coal transacted.  The analysis given here will use multi-level models to 




The data come from the Coal Transportation Rate Database (CTRB), which is maintained 
by the Energy Information Administration (EIA).  The EIA compiles the CTRB largely 
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Form 580 “Interrogatory on 
Fuel and Energy Purchase Practices,” a biennial survey of investor-owned, interstate 
electric utility plants with steam-electric generating stations of more than 50 megawatts.  
The dataset contains information on coal transactions for the years 1979-1999.  This 
survey is more detailed than other surveys (FERC 423, for example) but it uses a smaller 
sample of plants.   
 
The dataset can be thought of as two separate data sources merged.  The first set of 
information is on the contracts.  The contract characteristics given include year signed, 
duration, year renegotiated, year of each delivery, price adjustment mechanism and 
acceptable bounds on the coal attributes.  These variables stay constant (unless the 
contract is renegotiated) across the deliveries.  Each contract has a number of deliveries 
associated with it, though the data set is an unbalanced panel set as some contracts’ 
deliveries are more frequently reported than others.  The second set is information on 
each delivery from a specified contract.  Each delivery will specify the attributes of the 
  
coal delivered as well as the price paid.  A discussion of contract characteristics is next, 
followed by coal delivery specifics.   
      
The real delivered price per ton of coal is the dependent variable in the first level of this 
analysis.  Prices were adjusted for inflation using the Producer Price Index for crude 
energy materials with 1982 as the base year (Economic Report of the President, Table B-
66, 2004).  The dependent variable in the second level is the estimated coefficient (from 
the first level) on each contract, which represents the impact the specific contract has on 
this real delivered price.  The dependent variable in the third level is the estimated 
coefficient (from the second level) on each plant, which represents the impact of each 
plant on the real delivered price of coal through its impact on the contract.  
 
The explanatory variables used in this analysis are separated into contract parameters and 
delivery variables.  The contract parameters are used in the second level of the analysis.  
Contract parameters are the result of bargaining between mines, transportation firms, and 
plants.  The first contract parameter is the price adjustment mechanism.   As noted in 
Joskow (1988, 1990) each coal contract has its own price adjustment mechanism that 
may impact the price of a given delivery.  We create an ordinal price adjustment 
mechanism variable that takes the value of 1 for the most completely specified/inflexible 
adjustment mechanism (fixed price) up to the value of 6 for the least completely 
specified/flexible (yearly negotiation).  The second contract parameter is the duration of 
the contract.  The data include the year that the contract was signed and the year that it is 
set to expire.  Contract duration is created as the difference between the year signed and 
  
year expired.  The third contract parameter is the acceptable sulfur content upper bound. 
The data give the sulfur content by weight of the coal and list the upper bound, with the 
understanding that the lower bound is zero for sulfur.  The sulfur content was transformed 
into an amount of SO2 per ton of coal using emissions factors given by the EIA (1999a) 
based on the coal’s Btu content.   The upper bound on SO2 is interacted with a post-1990 
variable (one for contracts signed or renegotiated in the years 1991-1999; otherwise zero) 
to determine if the switch to a cap-and-trade SO2 permit system altered the manner in 
which the SO2 bound impacted prices. The fourth and fifth contract parameters are the 
upper bounds on ash and moisture content.  As with the sulfur content, data are given by 
weight of the coal and list the upper bound, with the understanding that the lower bound 
is zero.  The sixth contract parameter is the acceptable Btu content lower bound.  The 
lower bound is used because Btu is a good from the plants perspective while sulfur, ash, 
and moisture are bads.  The seventh, and final contract parameter is the acceptable 
quantity lower bound. 
 
The independent variables in the first level analysis (delivery variables) follow those of 
Lange and Bellas (2007).  Delivered coal attributes (Btu, SO2, ash and moisture) are the 
first four variables.  Transportation costs are the next set of variables.  Transportation 
variables include the total distance traveled and the total distance traveled squared to 
control for any non-linearities in the transportation pricing function.  The final 
transportation variable is a number of modes variable, ranging from one to four, listing 
the number of modes of transportation and a dummy variable equal to one if multiple 
types of transportation (rail, truck, barge) are used and zero otherwise.  Dummy variables 
  
for mine location are created for each of the 23 Bureau of Mines District.  Year dummy 
variables are created as well as a year trend variable.  The year trend is equal to 1 in 1979 





To determine how contract parameters impact the price of coal, multi-level modeling is 
used.  First, a fixed-effect estimator grouped by contract was used to estimate the average 
effect of each contract on the price of coal controlling for the coal’s attributes and the 
transportation costs.4 The model estimated in the first level is: 
 
          [1] 
 
Where Pit is the price of coal delivery i at time t, aj is a contract dummy, Xit is a vector of 
delivered coal attributes, Tit is a vector of transportation variables,  Dit is a vector of 
dummy control variables, and εit is an error term. 
 
The second level uses the first level estimated contract coefficients as the dependent 
variable.  The variables in the second level relate contract parameters to the average 
effect of the contract on the price of coal.  The model estimated in the second level is:   
 
                                                 
4 A Hausman test is performed on the first step to ensure that a fixed-effects estimator is the correct 
specification. 
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        [2] 
 
Where 
^α  is the contract coefficient from the first level (Model 1) and CPj is a vector of 
contract parameters, and νj is an error term. 
  
The multi-level model framework is used because it fits the structure of coal contract data 
well.  There are other reasons multi-level models are used, rather than one estimation 
equation.  First, only a fraction of the information listed in a contract is given in the data 
which implies that contract fixed effects are necessary to control for this unknown 
information.  Since the known contract parameters generally don’t vary within contract, if 
the model was estimated in one equation the known contract parameters would be 
perfectly collinear and thus dropped.  Second, the allowable upper/lower bounds of coal 
attributes are highly correlated with actual delivered coal attributes.  Estimating both 
variables in one level would be statistically difficult. Finally, Moulton (1990) discusses 
the negative implications of including variables from multiple levels in one equation, 
including downwardly biased standard errors. 
 
The expected signs of the contract parameters should follow that of the expected effect on 
price.  The effect of the completeness/flexibility of the price adjustment mechanism on 
the price of the coal is ambiguous. The effect of duration effect on price is ambiguous; 
plants presumably have a higher willingness to pay for longer contracts as they are 
assured the supply of coal necessary to meet demand.  Mines would presumably have a 
lower willingness to accept with longer contracts as they are ensured a customer for their 
  
product.  Quantity lower bound is expected to have an ambiguous effect on price as large 
purchasers may expect a discount; however a higher lower bound on quantity would 
increase the chance of being unable to fulfill the contract due to their capital need 
maintenance or inclement weather.   
 
The expected sign for the allowable coal attributes follows from the previous discussion 
of their use as quasi-forward contracts. The acceptable Btu content lower bound is 
expected to have a positive sign given that Btus are a good while the acceptable ash and 
moisture content upper bounds are expected to have negative estimated coefficients given 
ash and moisture are bads.  Acceptable sulfur content upper bound and its interaction 
with the post-1991 dummy is expected to have a negative sign.  Given that pre-1991 SO2 
regulation essentially put a price of zero on marginal changes in sulfur content and a cap-
and-trade SO2 system places a price on marginal changes in sulfur content, it is expected 
that the post-1991 interaction term will be larger (in absolute value terms) than the non-
interacted SO2 term.  
 
For the reasons given above, the expected sign of Btu is positive and the expected signs 
of ash, sulfur, and moisture content are negative in the first level.  Distance travelled is 
expected to increase the price while the distance travelled squared is expected to be 
ambiguous.  The number of modes is expected to increase the price. The expected signs 
of the independent variables in the first and second levels are found in Table II.  
 
  
Given the change in the form of sulfur regulation with the 1990 CAAA, it is expected 
that the relationship between the allowable upper bound of sulfur content and the 
delivered sulfur content may change.  To investigate this, Table III gives the deviation of 
delivered sulfur content from allowable upper bound of sulfur content for the entire 
sample, pre-1991, and 1991 and beyond.  A positive number implies that the delivered 
sulfur content is less than the allowable upper bound of sulfur content.  Although not 
reported in the table, about 10% of the observations are negative, implying that the 
delivered sulfur content was higher than the allowable sulfur content.  Table III shows 
that the deviation in sulfur content did shrink over the two time periods and that a t-test 




The regression results for the two levels are given in Tables IV and V.  Table IV shows 
the results from the first level, which is consistent with the expectations given in Table II.  
There are about 18,000 deliveries from 2421 contracts in the sample.  A simpler sulfur 
specification is used here than in Lange and Bellas (2007) since dissecting the different 
sulfur premiums for different groups are not the main focus of the paper.  Higher Btu 
content, greater distance traveled, and more transportation modes statistically increase the 
price.  Ash and moisture content statistically reduce the price.  The SO2 coefficients are 
in line with Lange and Bellas (2007), around $80 per ton of SO2.   
 
  
 Table V shows the results for the second level.  The dependent variable is the contract 
coefficient from the first level regression. Again, most coefficients are in line with the 
expectations give in Table II.  The coefficients given reflect how the contract parameters 
affected the price of coal controlling for the delivery variables from the first level.  
Longer contracts, which have an ambiguous expected sign, are associated with a higher 
price.  This implies that, in equilibrium, the higher plant willingness to pay exceeds the 
mines lower willingness to accept.  A larger minimum quantity and allowable upper 
bound of moisture content is associated with a lower price.  Higher allowable lower 
bound on Btu statistically significantly increases the price.    
 
The variable of most interest for environmental policy is the allowable upper bound of 
sulfur content. The allowable upper bound of sulfur content is not statistically different 
from zero for contracts signed previous to the switch to a tradable permit system for SO2 
emissions. Contracts signed after the switch, show a roughly $28 per ton ($20 in 1995 
dollars) premium.  This implies that contracts priced the cost of potential excess SO2 
emissions from allowing higher sulfur content in the deliveries into their contracts, 
controlling for the actual delivered sulfur content. Mines evidently had enough 
bargaining power in the contracting process to capture more gains from trade once the 





The nested structure of contract coal transactions can be used to determine how contract 
parameters affect the price of coal. Multi-level models (also known as hierarchical 
models) fit these types of data well.  In this analysis, each level of the contract process is 
analyzed separately.  In the first level, a hedonic price regression is run on the coal 
deliveries controlling for the delivered coal attributes and contract fixed effects.  These 
contract coefficients are then used as a dependent variable in the second level.  In the 
second level, contract coefficients are regressed on the contract parameters to determine 
how contract parameters affect the price paid for coal.  This will allow for the estimation 
of the effect of contract parameters on the price of coal controlling for the actual 
delivered quality of coal. 
 
Data from U.S. coal contracts for electricity generation from 1979-1999 are used to 
estimate the multi-level model described above. Given the natural variability of coal in a 
seam, it is expected that contracts whose parameters allow greater flexibility (a higher 
allowable upper bound for moisture for example) would show a price discount.    Second 
level results generally support this hypothesis.  Other results reveal that longer contracts 
are associated with a higher price.  One contract parameter of interest is the allowable 
upper bound of sulfur content.  During the sample period, environmental regulation of 
SO2, an emission that is a by product of coal combustion, changed from an emissions 
standard to a tradable permit system.  As a result, plants would value marginal changes in 
the sulfur content. Indeed, the results show that the allowable sulfur content was 
  
statistically insignificant prior to this change in regulation and statistically significant 
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Table I: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D
Delivered Price, $ per ton 45.99 15.30
Btu, per pound 11,603.00 1,541.00
SO2, tons per ton of coal 0.02 0.02
Ash, % by weight 9.40 3.10
Moisture, % by weight 9.09 8.30
Distance, miles 449.00 528.00
# of modes of transport 0.31 0.46
Contract Completeness, Ordinal 2.10 1.22
Duration, Years 7.80 9.10
SO2 Upper Bound, tons per ton of coal 0.03 0.02
Post-1991 SO2 Interaction 0.01 0.02
Ash Upper Bound, % by weight 10.80 4.15
Moisture Upper Bound, % by weight 11.40 7.50
Btu Lower Bound, per pound 11,613.00 2,000.00
Quantity Lower Bound, 500 tons 0.75 1.80
  
Table II: Expected Signs, by Level 
Variables Expected Sign






# of Modes of Transport +
Total Distance +
Distance Squared +/-
Contract Parameters (2nd Stage)
Contract Completeness +/-
Duration +/-
SO2 Upper Bound -
Post-1991 SO2 Interaction -
Ash Upper Bound -
Moisture Upper Bound -
Btu Lower Bound +
Quantity Lower Bound +/-




Table III: Delivered Sulfur Content & Allowable Sulfur Content Variation 
Allowable Sulfur Content  - Delivered Sulfur Content
Sample All Contracts Pre-1991 Post-1991
Mean 0.32 0.35 0.25
Median 0.19 0.21 0.14
S.D. 0.01 0.012 0.008
T-test (Mean Pre-1991 ≠ Mean Post-1991) = 6.6  
 
Percentage Difference in Delivered and Allowable Attribute
Contract Fixed Effects Regression
Attribute: Sulphur Ash Moisture Btu
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Phase 1 Plant -0.01               
(0.02)
0.04**            
(0.01)
0.06**            
(0.02)
0.01                
(0.01)
Post-1990 0.05*              
(0.02)
0.03                
(0.02)
-0.01               
(0.05)
-0.01               
(0.01)
Phase 1 * Post 1990 -0.03               
(0.02)
-0.01               
(0.02)
-0.03               
(0.03)
-0.01               
(0.01)
Region Dummies Not Shown for Brevity
Serially Correlation Corrected Standard Errors in Parenthesis
* indicates 5% signifiance, ** indicates 1% significance
  
Table IV: First Level Results 





SO2-Post 1990** -37.79 10.63
Moisture** -8.24 1.80
# of Modes of Transport** 1.80 0.10
Total Distance** 4.40 0.50
Distance Squared -1.9E-06 5.00E-07
Year & Mine District Dummies Included
Price of Distances in Mils
* indicates 5% signifiance, ** indicates 1% significance




Table V: Second Level Results 
Dependent Variable: First Level Contract Dummies
Variable Coefficient S.E.
Contract Completeness** -0.27 0.07
Duration*** 0.11 0.01
SO2 Upper Bound 5.29 5.45
Post-1991 SO2 Interaction** -28.49 10.00
Ash Upper Bound 0.04 0.04
Moisture Upper Bound** -0.08 0.03
Btu Lower Bound** 0.00 0.00
Quantity Lower Bound** 0.19 0.08
* indicates 5% signifiance, ** indicates 1% significance  
 
